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abstract
While social geographers have convincingly made the case that space is not an
external constant, but rather is produced through inter-relations, anthropologists and
sociologists have done much to further an understanding of time, as itself constituted
through social interaction and inter-relation. Their work suggests that time is not an
apolitical background to social life, but shapes how we perceive and relate to others.
For those interested in exploring issues such as identity, community and difference,
this suggests that attending to how temporal discourses are utilised in relation to
these issues is a key task. This article seeks to contribute to an expansion of the
debate about time and sociality by contributing an analysis of a variety of ways in
which Gloria Anzaldu´a utilises temporal concepts as part of her work of rethinking
social identity and community. In particular, I suggest that in contesting
homogeneous identity, Anzaldu´a also implicitly contests linear temporal frameworks.
Further, in creating new frameworks for identity, I suggest the possibility of discerning
an alternative approach to time in her work that places difference at the heart of
simultaneity. I suggest that the interconnection between concepts of time and
community within Anzaldu´a’s work indicates, more broadly, that attempts to rework
understandings of relationality must be accompanied by reworked accounts of
temporality.
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Within the West, space and time have traditionally been understood as shaping
our sense of how we are with others in two key ways: we are together with others
insofar as we occupy the same space; but divided from ourselves and from others
due to the movement of time. The assumption that space brings together, while
time divides, arises from the idea that different parts of space remain within the
same all-encompassing space, whereas different moments of time are necessarily
separate. Without the movement of time there would be no change or
differentiation, while without the stability and sameness of space there could be
no continuity. Of course, things are never as simple as this, as many social
geographers have argued. What such assumptions reveal, however, is the key role
that seemingly abstract concepts of space and time have in shaping what is
meant by sameness, difference, community and individualisation. The central
argument of this paper, then, is that attempts to transform what is meant by
community or identity are necessarily accompanied by shifts in senses of time
and space, even if only implicitly. In the interest of brevity I have chosen to focus
particularly on shifts in time, though concepts of space will always be implicated.
In particular, I will examine Gloria Anzaldu´a’s ground-breaking challenges to
notions of social identity and political coalition in order to show how they are
rooted in implicit challenges to social understandings of time as linear.
Specifically, I will suggest that her work challenges the tendency to separate
difference out across time and instead utilises a notion of simultaneity that
seeks to enable the recognition of difference within the ‘same’ moment of time.
time and community
As a key writer within US Third World feminism, Gloria Anzaldu´a’s work seeks to
theorise forms of sociality that resist attempts to assimilate difference. Crucial
to this attempt is her reworking of the concept of ‘community’ away from its
idealisation as a safe non-threatening group, characterised by similarity in goals
and values, ease of communication, comfort and familiarity. This is not to say
that Anzaldu´a rejects the ideal of community altogether, but rather that she
seeks to transform it in two main ways. First, she refuses sameness as an
aspirational ideal. Instead, she focuses on the difficult work involved in forming
political partnerships and communities that acknowledge the way their members
may be divided against each other. Second, these modes of sociality are
underpinned by a reworked account of identity. She argues that the false
dichotomies offered by traditional models of identity split or fragment complex
identities into discrete social categories, which consequently restrict the way we
feel ourselves to be connected with the different aspects of ourselves and with
others. In so doing, Anzaldu´a’s work offers a more nuanced understanding of
belonging that resists the lure of unity or mathematical ideas of equivalence. I
will argue that underlying these critiques of homogeneous community and
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categorical identity, are implicit criticisms of linear conceptions of time.
However, first I will explore the interconnections between concepts of time and
concepts of community.
Although the problems of time and community may at first seem to have little to
connect them, one prominent attempt to rethink community explicitly ties the
problem of community to the question of temporality. For Iris Marion Young,
the erasure of complexity and difference highlighted by Anzaldu´a arises from the
way a certain understanding of time shapes concepts of community. As she
argues in her influential essay ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of
Difference’:
The ideal of community participates in what Derrida calls the metaphysics of presence or
Adorno calls the logic of identity, a metaphysics that denies difference. The ideal of
community presumes subjects who are present to themselves and presumes subjects can
understand another as they understand themselves. It thus denies the difference between
subjects. (1986: 1–2)
Young thus criticises a certain mode of belonging – one based upon the self-
presence of subjects to themselves and to each other – for the way it limits who
can be regarded as part of the community. Most importantly, Young criticises this
mode of belonging because it is itself linked to a certain approach to time.
Therefore, while time can be thought of as that which divides or separates, insofar as
we are thought to share time with others, this shared time has primarily been thought
in terms of a homogeneous present or presence. That is, the time that we share is
thought to be a ‘now’ that brings differing experiences, histories and anticipations
into a certain alignment by virtue of a shared moment in the present. For example,
despite the many qualitative differences in each person’s life, clock time enables
each individual’s hour to be standardised as the same hour. The clock allows
individuals to assume that, barring error, my 8:15am is aligned with your 8:15am.
Linear time, understood as a series of discrete now points, thus potentially offers
communities the ability to render individual senses of time commensurable at any
moment of the day. What is important to note, however, is that this commensurability
is dependent on ignoring difference and focusing, instead, on what can be made
homogeneous and uniform. Young thus rejects the ideal of community because of its
dependence on an ideal of presence that ignores difference.
What is particularly problematic is that if linear time ‘manages’ difference by
ignoring it and focusing on commensurability, then this mode of relating to
difference becomes hidden inasmuch as linear time is thought to be
commonsensical or straightforward. ‘Time’ comes to appear as if it were an
inert, yet cohesive, background within which social life, in all its diversity, is
negotiated. However, in her intriguing account of the political nature of social
time, Carol Greenhouse has suggested that where one way of understanding time
is presented as occurring homogeneously across a society, as is overwhelmingly
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the case with linear time, this should not be interpreted as ‘natural’ but rather as
a product of social contest (1996: 4). She argues that, in fact, there are always
multiple ways of living time within any society, each with their attendant values,
which in turn guide different constructions of the past and hopes for the future.
She claims that ‘the proliferation of times has many causes, some internal, some
external. New forms of time are regularly introduced or imposed through people’s
participation in social institutions, such as work, school, religious or political
ritual, or law’ (1996: 96). These new time frames differently shape what is viewed
as significant, how the flow and directionality of time is understood, as well as how
different moments of time are understood to be connected to each other.
Greenhouse argues that these different guidelines interact in a variety of ways,
competing for dominance, mutually reinforcing each other, or annulling each other.
The understanding of time that dominates a society is not, therefore, an inert
apolitical background, but rather is a cultural strategy used to manage the
differences between social members and their multiple ‘times’. Georges Gurvitch,
for example, argued that the multiple times that characterise societies elicit
methods for managing this diversity and limiting possible conflicts. Indeed for
John Hassard, the importance of Gurvitch’s work lies in the way it shows, more
generally, how cultures are ‘characterised by a melange of conflicting times, and
how groups are constantly competing over a choice of appropriate times’ (1990: 4).
Like Greenhouse then, Gurvitch argued that one consequence of this competition
is that ‘every society must attempt to unify, even if only relatively, these multiple
manifestations of social time and attempt to arrange them in a hierarchy’ (1964:
13). What this suggests is that linear time dominates particular societies, not
because it is the most scientific or accurate way of telling the time, but because
it appears to offer the best resources for managing both ‘the logistical and
existential challenges of living in the company of others’ (Greenhouse, 1996: ix).
That is, linear time represents one of the models by which Western societies
manage social diversity.
Importantly, Greenhouse suggests that one of the primary ways concepts of linear
time are utilised in the management of social differences is by ‘redefining
incommensurabilities within a single representational system’ (1996: 213). That
is, she suggests that concepts of linear time are used to foster the belief that
diverse ways of living time are actually commensurable when understood in terms
of a postulated ‘single principle of selection (or a single hierarchy of
principlesy)’ (1989: 1636). This claim is most easily understood in reference to
logistical differences. Indeed, with the growing spheres of interaction found in a
globalising world, the uniformity and consistency offered by a single standard of
time appears as a promising model for dealing with an increasingly diverse global
community. Whereas regions once measured time in a variety of ways, making
them incommensurable, the provision of standardised time zones, which unite the
globe within a single commensurable representational system, has provided an
feminist review 97 2011 the contradictory simultaneity of being with others154
essential background for increased expansion of trade, travel and communica-
tion. However, while standardised time reckoning systems may, indeed, be
important for managing the logistical challenges of community, enabling
accurate transportation schedules, for example, Greenhouse’s work suggests that
the values that inhere within the notion of a single all-encompassing linear
progression of time are not isolated from the existential challenges of living in
community. That is, her work suggests that representations of time not only
provide models for how to manage the timing of different social activities, but
also provide models for how the different values and meanings encountered
within social life can be managed.
One such model for managing the diversity of values or meanings, which has
proven to be particularly problematic within feminist coalition and community
work, provides a good example of the way linear models of time feed into broader
questions of identity and community. This model arguably builds upon the notion
of time as a linear succession of isolated instants, in order to suggest that the
best way to deal with political questions is to arrange them hierarchically in
order of importance and deal with them one at a time. In other words, the
attempt to deal with ‘one thing at a time’ provides a model for how groups
should arrange competing values and meanings, in that the diversity of demands
for response can not be responded to ‘at once’, but must be ordered and
arranged in terms of importance. Differences are no longer simultaneous but are
separated out and spread across time. While this way of acting may seem logical,
it is precisely this particular use of linear metaphors that provide an important, if
implicit, focus for Anzaldu´a’s critical work. As Romand Coles has argued, her work
suggests that, ‘the world is both too full of myriad modes of subjugation and
suffering, and too rich in possibilities of wisdom and thriving, for any single set
of principles or teleology to be nearly sufficient for democratic struggle’ (2001:
495). What I will now explore is the way her work actively resists the temptation
to reduce our understanding of social processes to singular linear accounts. In so
doing, she rejects the limitations of a linear time frame and instead seeks to
present society as being constituted by multiple conflicting processes that are
not entirely commensurable, and yet must be understood as simultaneous.
diversity and simultaneity
In order to discuss my claim that Anzaldu´a’s work introduces a radical account of
simultaneity, I will analyse two well-known passages from her work. The first
comes from This Bridge Called My Back, and is most often cited in order to show
her refusal to engage in traditional politics based on a single group identity (see,
for example, Keating, 2006: 6). She writes:
I am a wind-swayed bridge, a crossroads inhabited by whirlwinds. Gloria, the facilitator.
Gloria the mediator, straddling the walls between abysses. ‘Your allegiance is to La Raza,
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the Chicano movement,’ say the members of my race. ‘Your allegiance is to the Third World,’
say my Black and Asian friends. ‘Your allegiance is to your gender, to women,’ say the
feminists. Then there’s my allegiance to the Gay movement, to the socialist revolution, to
the New Age, to magic and the occult. And there’s my affinity to literature, to the world of
the artist. What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings. They
would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. (1983: 205)
While Anzaldu´a is without doubt criticising traditional notions of identity, I would
like to suggest that what is also at stake here is a certain notion of time.
Specifically, Anzaldu´a is implicitly rejecting the understanding of time, already
discussed above, which suggests that one can only respond to one value or
principle at a time.
Arguably, the belief that political demands are best responded to one at a time
arises from the notion that time is divisible into single unitary moments or ‘nows’
within which only one thing can happen at once. Indeed, it is a truism that one
can not do two (or three or four) things within the same moment or now. As
Jacques Derrida comments, in the interview ‘Negotiations’, ‘usually for common
sense (which is sometimes philosophy) one cannot make two different gestures
and especially two contradictory gestures at once. One cannot do this at the
same time. It is not possible’ (2002: 23). However, he points out that the claim
‘it is not possible’ only remains true insofar as one presupposes ‘that something
like a moment, an instant, a place, and an I that is ruled by this unity exist’
(ibid.). For Anzaldu´a such presuppositions are impossible. The wholeness that
has traditionally been promised by the ‘moment’ or the ‘instant’ is categorically
not available to her. Not because she celebrates what has been called
post-modern indeterminacy, but because to be whole within a traditional Western
metaphysical framework is to be without contradiction. Yet, as she vividly
attests, her sense of her own wholeness is cut and fragmented by the social
categories used by others to politically situate her. In any one ‘moment’ she is
always already divided by contradictions and called to respond to multiplying
demands.
Further, in the above quotation, Anzaldu´a suggests that her fragmented
experiences can not be grounded within a unified ‘place’. The sense of space that
the quotation evokes does not fit neatly with a static, unchanging, all-
encompassing space that equally contains each of its different parts. Instead,
she finds herself in an in-between place, described alternately as a bridge or a
crossroads. She is located in the marginal space experienced while travelling from
one place to another, a marginality that is further emphasised by her reference
to walled abysses. These marginal spaces are not static or stable, rather they are
wind-swept and wind-swayed. Thus, without access to either a unified stable
place or a unified stable moment Anzaldu´a does not appear to be presupposing
an ‘I’ that would be gracefully contained in either a ‘place’ or a ‘moment’.
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Indeed, she must ask ‘who am I?’ and although she answers, she still appears to
be highlighting the way her sense of self must continue to be articulated in terms
of the categories that fracture and mislabel her. In this way, Anzaldu´a challenges
each of the presuppositions set out in Derrida’s assertion above. As a
consequence, her work suggests the need for a sense of time that would not
render the attempt to do more than one thing at once automatically impossible.
She thus opens the way for a different model of managing competing values and
meanings within social life, one that would recognise incommensurabilities
simultaneously.
In resisting the division of the social world into homogeneous and discrete
categories, and the way such divisions fragment her identity, her political
allegiances and her ability to connect with others, Anzaldu´a must therefore (even
if only implicitly) locate this identity, these allegiances, within another ‘time’.
That is, she must challenge the mode of managing difference implicit within
linear time. A hint at what this other time might be can be located in the
second example that I will discuss, which comes from Borderlands/La Frontera.
Importantly, as I have mentioned above, Anzaldu´a does not suggest a generalised
dispersal in contrast to the ‘moment’. Instead, she searches for ways of ‘keeping
intact one’s shifting and multiple identity and integrity’ (1999: 19). In so doing,
she is not, however, searching for a lost unity or for a new mode of self-presence
underpinned by an understanding of time as a series of ‘now’ points. As Susan
Bickford explains:
The language of ‘refusing the split’ may seem to indicate the kind of desire for wholeness
that our post-modern eyes are trained to treat suspiciously. But this desire to ‘bring
together’ parts of the self is a response to a political landscape that tries to impose a
single piece as the whole. (2001: 67)
Rather, in attempting to bring together communities and individuals that are
fragmented by the reductive arithmetical logic of identity, Anzaldu´a utilises a
quite different logical and temporal framework.
In her attempts to maintain a certain integrity or wholeness, which simul-
taneously, and yet contradictorily, draw attention to the diversity and multiplicity
of social life,1 Anzaldu´a rejects the tendency to range political issues along a single
hierarchical line to be dealt with one at a time. She instead seeks a way of being
that can respond to heterogeneous demands at the same time. Once again, this is
not the ‘at the same time’, which we are familiar with through the use of the clock,
where the qualitative differences of each person’s moment are erased by the
assumption of an underlying commensurability and uniformity. Rather, Anzaldu´a’s
refusal to split her contradictory heritages, and the political demands each makes
upon her, suggests an understanding of simultaneity, where to be ‘at the same
time’ is to resist the desire to purge difference (and social contest) from the
1 Thanks to the
anonymous reviewer
who suggested this
point.
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present. Instead, to be coeval (i.e. to live in the same time with another) is to
recognise the multiple lines of time and of history that operate within the present,
in ways that are not fully commensurable.
The second crucial passage that helps to shed light on what sense of coevalness
or being together ‘at the same time’ might be at work within Anzaldu´a’s text is
one which appears twice in the first section of Borderlands/La Frontera, at the
beginning as part of a larger poem and at the end, as the final words:
This land was Mexican once
was Indian always
and is.
And will be again. (1999: 113)
Anzaldu´a is here describing her ‘community of place’, the vague and uncertain
land that, in this instance, is represented as Aztla´n, the mythical homeland of
the Aztec people. The figure of Aztla´n has played a key role in the Chicano
Movement’s attempt to claim national rights to the South-West United States.2
Anzaldu´a, however, subverts the nationalistic overtones that have been part of
the work of recuperating Aztla´n by suggested a more indeterminate and dis-
unified relationship between a land and its peoples.3 In her treatment, Aztla´n
does not become the rightful home of a unified people; rather she highlights the
way this land has been invaded and re-invaded, home to Native Mexican
and American civilisations, Spanish conquistadors and Anglo-Americans. What
is interesting is that in announcing the differing, and yet simultaneous, political
demands that arise from this turbulent and violent history, she utilises a
confusing amalgam of incongruent presents, pasts and futures.
Anzaldu´a does not, therefore, assert a linear history of the South-West US, as
that which was successively Native American, then Mexican, then part of the US.
Instead, she writes a history of the borderlands that affirms and recognises
its contradictory historical trajectories simultaneously. In so doing, she is not
attempting to manage these diverse histories by rendering them commensurable
(in reference to an all-encompassing spatial or temporal background), or by
ordering them hierarchically. Rather, Anzaldu´a brings attention to continuing,
and yet contradictory, claims that can not simply be displaced. She thus calls for
an end to the obstinate lapse in memory regarding the US invasion of Mexico and
the subsequent occupation of what is now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado
and California. Moreover, in seeking to recognise the injustices that are obscured
by linear histories of the South-West, she also brings attention to the way, even
this recognition, is not itself sufficient, since it also obscures another history –
the repeated attempts to dispossess indigenous peoples. While within linear time
the rise of a new moment is thought to annul the previous one, for Anzaldu´a, the
rise of another political claim does not annul all previous claims. This suggests
that she rejects linear models for understanding and managing the complexity of
2 For a closer
analysis of the
mythic, historical
and utopian
significance of
Aztla´n see Watts,
2004.
3 A complexity that
was denied by the
California based
‘Save Our State’
organisation, who in
2005 protested
against a monument
in Baldwin Park,
bearing Anzaldua’s
poem, claiming that
it was seditious and
racist.
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social life. Rather, her claim ‘was Indian always’ suggests that the history upon
which indigenous claims are based abides within the present as a past that can
never be cancelled out.
Further, one can discern in the above passage the suggestion that doing justice
to Mexican and indigenous claims in the present would not guarantee an end to
the complex and violent interactions between them or between them and the rest
of the US. The promise of continuing complexity and contradiction can be seen in
the last two lines, where her recognition of ‘what is’ is repeated in the future
tense. However, ‘what is’ does not appear in a future tense that would indicate a
simple continuation of the present. Rather, in utilising the future perfect, she
suggests that the future holds a promise of transformation, a promise of what
‘will be again’. Anzaldu´a’s complex negotiation of this heritage thus suggests the
need for communities to be guided by less reductive temporal accounts than the
traditional linear histories, which split and divide differences by isolating them
within different stages or moments, thus obscuring both the diversity of the
present and the continuing claims of the past.4 But further, her work suggests
that the idea that it is only possible to do or be one thing at a time potentially
restricts who one is able to be in community with, and thus what kinds of
possibilities are open to political community more generally.
challenging hegemonic temporal models of
activism
So far I have argued that Anzaldua’s work challenges the tendency to divide
affiliations or loyalties from each other and arrange them separately along
a linear time-line. Instead, by arguing for the need to respond to conflicting
loyalties at once, she moves from idealisations of unity within the self and the
community towards the development of a sense of wholeness that recognises the
simultaneity of conflicts, divisions and contradictions. One way of expanding this
account of simultaneity, then, is to focus on what it might mean to respond to
these conflicting loyalties. Indeed, in this section I will argue that Anzaldu´a not
only rejects the management of diverse histories through the creation of linear
time-lines, she also challenges the tendency within feminism to arrange diverse
models of acting in a similar way. Such a tendency is epitomised by the division
of feminism into waves, each with a different emphasis and favoured mode of
activism. Anzaldua’s work again shows how the tendency to divide difference
across different moments in time creates exclusionary effects, particularly by
restricting one’s sense of who one should work with and in what ways. Further, she
shows how dividing modes of acting across time periods or phases reduces one’s
range of options for acting within community. In particular, I see Anzaldu´a as
criticising the concepts of change and agency that underpin the notion of fixed
developmental stages through which individuals or groups must pass in the same
4 As Marı´a Lugones
argues, the illusion
of discrete social
categories is, in
part, attributable to
particular
representations of
time and space,
which deny that
‘history is shared,
conflictual, and in
relation to social
power’ (2003: 198).
The contestation of
a single linear
history in favour of
‘multiple historical
lines’ is thus thought
to be one of the key
steps that enable
the possibility of
reconfiguring
community as
heterogeneous
and conflicting
(ibid.: 201).
Consequently,
Lugones’ own visions
of communities
as impure and
heterogeneous ‘are
forged in a line of
historico-spatial
impurity’ (ibid.).
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or similar way. This approach has been fundamental to a variety of colonialist
discourses, among others, and has problematically shaped what kinds of options
for acting and for interacting have appeared to be feasible within a variety of
social movements, including certain feminist movements.
To get a better idea of just what these temporal models are and how they impact
upon conceptions of community and activism, I will follow Chela Sandoval’s
analysis of the rejection by US Third World feminists, including Anzaldu´a, of what
she terms ‘feminism’s great hegemonic model’ (2000: 47–54). In her book
Methodology of the Oppressed, Sandoval argues that during the 1980s, the desire
to consolidate and systematise feminist knowledge led theorists from a range of
disciplines to develop a number of similar historical models that ‘fast became
the official stories by which the women’s movement understood itself and its
interventions in history’ (2000: 47). Some examples Sandoval cites include work
by Julia Kristeva (1981), Alison Jaggar (1983) and Toril Moi (1985). Although not
all such historical models were exactly alike, Sandoval distinguishes a certain
commonality, particularly in the way three ‘phases’ of feminism are discerned:
first a focus on equality with men; secondly on difference from men; and thirdly,
propositions of a distinct feminine experience, morality and/or culture.
Importantly, Sandoval points out that these histories are specifically told in
terms of shifts in modes of acting, that is, shifts in shared understandings of
what kinds of actions bring about change, what kinds of goals should be pursued,
and which particular problems are of most relevance for women in a particular
time period. In so doing, these accounts of feminism specifically set up a history
that is thought in terms of the changes in feminist modes of political activism.
The key problem for Sandoval, and for this article, is that these histories are
arranged as ‘distinct evolutionary phases through which activists pass in their
quest to end the subordination of women’ (2000: 44).5 Specifically, in becoming
tied to an evolutionary model, these feminist histories do not act merely as
accounts of the changes that have occurred within feminist activism over time.
Rather, they risk feeding into the broader social connotations of evolutionary
metaphors, including the idealisation of progress. By arranging modes of acting
within a linear framework, there is the risk that more recent modes come
to unproblematically signify increasing sophistication, while older modes are
dismissed as inadequate, deficient or obsolete.6 This has at least two conse-
quences, the first of which is the repetition, within feminism, of the kinds of
temporal distancing techniques utilised within the colonial encounter, while the
second is that different modes of activism come to be seen as mutually
exclusive.
With regards to the first consequence, the linear representation of time suggests
that time moves from the past toward the future in a single sequence of non-
repeatable moments. While time is supposed to be all encompassing, the
progressivist character of linear temporal frameworks has been utilised as a
5 It is not
necessarily clear
that Kristeva fits
with Sandoval’s
characterisation
here, since, in her
essay, Kristeva
claims that, ‘my
usage of the word
“generation” implies
less a chronology
that a signifying
space y So it can
be argued that as of
now a third attitude
is possible, thus a
third generation,
which does not
exclude – quite the
contrary – the
parallel existence of
all three in the same
historical time, or
even that they be
interwoven one with
the other’ (1981:
feminist review 97 2011 the contradictory simultaneity of being with others160
method of managing threatening diversity. In particular, the temporalities of
others are rearranged so that they join the line of Western time at some point in
its past, thus excluding this diversity from the ‘present’. The classic example of
such a use of time can be found in colonialist interpretations of indigenous
peoples as the ‘timeless’ relics of a primitive past, which has long since been
surpassed by more ‘advanced’ nations. In this way, differences between groups
are understood as developmental, rather than constitutive, and the conflict
between them is downplayed.7 These techniques of temporal distancing thus limit
who is considered to be coeval with a particular group, and consequently limit
how the community may be constituted.
Importantly, the hegemonic feminist model of progress is not exempt from these
techniques, a point that Clare Hemmings has convincingly argued in her article
‘Telling Feminist Stories’ (2005). Her account shows how the dominant modes of
recounting the history of feminism work in discriminatory ways. For instance, she
notes that within many accounts of the history of feminism,
the critiques of women of colour and Third World feminists are referred to in the past
tense, while the ‘growing interest’ in post-structuralism is linguistically still active and
present, allowing its proponents to ‘deploy’, ‘reject’ and ‘embrace.’ Post-structuralism thus
imaginatively spills over into the next decade, while the critiques of women of colour and
Third World women are temporally fixed by their frames of citation. (2005: 123)
Others have argued that the use of techniques of temporal distancing has
affected Western feminism’s capacity to build transnational networks. As Aili
Mari Tripp argues, the attempt to universalise a historical model, which is in fact
specific only to certain feminist movements,
has resulted, for example, in Western scholars often defining the global movement with
respect to the first and second waves of feminism in the West as though Western
movements were the precursors to similar movements in other parts of the world. (2006: 54)
More generally Shu-mei Shih criticises dominant feminist histories for coding
‘temporal movement in terms of progress and development, always implying that
what came after is superior to or an improvement over what came before’ (2002:
98). In each case, it is argued that the specificity of different feminist
movements and of individual feminist writers is obscured by the attempt to slot
them into a pre-fabricated schema of feminism’s evolution.
What can be drawn from such critiques is the importance of recognising the
way temporal concepts are used to ‘manage’ difference through exclusion
or incorporation through misrecognition. Specifically, certain ways of telling
histories (which are themselves supported by particular understandings of change
over time) reduce both who can be included within a community, and what types
of actions or goals are thought to be appropriate. For example, when it is
suggested that non-Western feminisms are adopting the concerns and methods of
33). Though I also
note that Kristeva is
here using ‘time’ to
signify separation
and ‘space’ to
signify togetherness,
the very dualism
under discussion in
this paper.
6 This is not to say
that all uses of the
notion of evolution
are necessarily
exclusionary in these
ways. Anzaldu´a
herself attempts to
refigure what is
meant by evolution,
as mentioned above.
See too, Elizabeth
Grosz’s The Nick of
Time: Politics,
Evolution and the
Untimely (2004).
Grosz argues that
the notion of
temporality that
arises in Darwin’s
work is not
deterministic or
teleological, but
rather suggests an
open and
unpredictable
future. In addition
to these recent
reworkings of
evolution, see
Penelope
Deutscher’s
discussions of the
complex and
contradictory uses
of evolutionary
theory in certain
nineteenth century
feminisms (2004,
2006).
7 See, for example,
Johannes Fabian’s
Time and the Other
(1983) and Anne
McClintock’s
discussion of
‘anachronistic space’
in Imperial Leather
(1995: 40–42).
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an ‘earlier’ feminist stage, the specificity of these feminisms is misrecognised as
‘the same’ as what ‘we’ went through and they are incorporated into the same line of
time, though not at the same stage. Even so, by placing certain feminisms within the
past of Western feminism, their coevalness is denied and one is no longer with the
other. In terms of what actions are deemed appropriate, when certain concerns are
contained within a past stage then such concerns come to be presented as somehow
no longer appropriate for Western feminists. Instead, it seems to be suggested that
certain modes of activism need to be left behind as part of the process of the
development of the feminist movement.8
As a result, if hegemonic feminist histories have, indeed, been written primarily
in terms of shifts of senses of appropriate modes of activism, then challenging
the way these histories limit both who is included within the feminist community,
and what actions are deemed appropriate, requires that the interrelations
between different modes of activism be rethought. One way of tackling both of
the limits imposed by such histories is to develop an account of time that will
enable contradictory histories and contradictory ways of acting to share the
same time, to be coeval with each other, rather than be divided from each other
as they are within linear accounts of time. Indeed, I would argue this is exactly
what Anzaldu´a is doing when she insists on the simultaneity of contradictory
loyalties and demands. However, I also want to suggest, by looking at another
example of her work, that she also insists on the simultaneity of modes of acting.
Anzaldu´a’s essay ‘Bridge, Drawbridge, Sandbar or Island: Lesbians-of-Colour
Hacienda Alianzas’ (1990), is a prime example of the attempt by the US Third
world feminists to subvert the hegemonic model discussed by Sandoval. To
reiterate, Sandoval has argued that hegemonic feminist histories have been built
around the assumption that the three ‘phases’ of feminism are political positions
that inherently contradict one another, and therefore can not share the same
time (2000: 51). In contrast, Anzaldu´a argues, in this essay, that there needs to
be a ‘chusando movidas’ or choice of moves within coalition work (1990: 216).
She thus attempts to bring together modes of acting, which have been divided
across time, as relevant and appropriate choices in the present. None of the
options are understood teleologically in terms of a progression from one tactic
to a ‘more advanced’ one. Rather, the utilisation of each one depends on the
situation at hand, the level of energy one is willing to commit, and the historical
forces one is trying to intervene within.
She elaborates each mode in reference to one of the four metaphors contained in
the essay’s title. The first move, to bridge, is to mediate across social divides in
an attempt to point out the commonalities and explain differences to others.
Such work broadly links with the emphasis within so-called first wave feminism of
arguing for equality based on the similarities between men and women. There are,
however, problems with such an approach in that engaging in bridging work ‘may
mean a partial loss of self. Being “there” for people all the time, mediating all
8 Importantly,
AnaLouise Keating
has suggested that
similar techniques
have inhibited the
reception of key
aspects of
Anzaldu´a’s own
work, specifically its
spiritual aspects
(see 2005, 2006,
2008). As she
summarises in a
recent essay, ‘in
short, references to
spirit, souls, the
sacred, and other
such spiritually
inflected topics are
often condemned as
essentialist,
escapist, naive, or in
other ways apolitical
and backward
thinking’ (2008: 55).
It appears essential
to consider whether
the avoidance of
discussing the place
of spirituality in
Anzaldu´a’s work is
an attempt to
‘manage’ this
threatening
difference by
temporally
distancing it from
the present.
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the time means risking being “walked” on, being “used” ’ (ibid.). One therefore
sometimes retreats, either temporarily as ‘drawbridge’, or more thoroughly as
‘island’. In these moves we can see the emphasis on withdrawing from the work of
developing commonalities, either through the celebration of difference, or
through a more emphatic withdrawal into separatism. These methods then, can
be correlated with the second and third phases of feminist history, as
characterised by Sandoval above. However, none of these options are static or
mutually exclusive. Instead, Anzaldu´a emphasises the ability to ‘shift’ between
tactics, not according to a prearranged order, but with reference to the
specificity of the situations one finds oneself within (1990: 224).
As such, temporal concepts linked with notions of progress such as ‘modern’,
‘forward-thinking’ or ‘backward’ are not used as easy guides for which action is
most appropriate. Rather, as Marı´a Lugones has argued, Anzaldu´a’s work subverts
attempts to set out ready-made options or choices for acting within the world
(2005). Indeed, in this essay, Anzaldu´a offers a fourth option of acting,
illustrated by the sandbar, that brings together bridge, drawbridge and island
into a mode of acting that allows each option to be available at once. She
describes the sandbar as a more fluid way of moving between tactics, which
seeks to respond more closely to the particular contexts of one’s actions. She
writes that ‘being a sandbar means getting a breather from being a perpetual
bridge without having to withdraw completely. The high tides and low tides of
your life are factors which help to decide whether or where you’re a sandbar
today, tomorrow’ (1990: 224). This metaphor of activism rejects the notion of the
self-contained individual who can only do one thing at once. The moment, or
instant that would guarantee self containment is contrasted here with an
endorsement of shifting movement, a tidal movement backwards and forwards,
that is not commensurable with a linear non-repeatable movement into the
future. Indeed, in recognising the complexity of social processes, and the possible
contradictory effects of each action, Anzaldu´a rejects a teleological model, which
would promise that particular issues that called upon particular ways of acting
would become obsolete. Rather, she highlights the way particular feminist gains
may have to be fought for again and again. Thus, instead of the non-repeatable
moment, Anzaldu´a utilises a temporal framework within which ‘you may have to
accept that there may be no solutions, resolutions or even agreement ever’ (1990:
227). Indeed, she argues that ‘the terms, solution, resolution, and progressing and
moving forwards are Western dominant cultural concepts’ (ibid.). Neither does her
account utilise a static unchanging all-encompassing space. Instead, space is
active, it shifts, has effects, transforms how one needs to understand where one is
politically situated. The ‘I’ who can only do one thing at once is thus contrasted
with a non-self identical contradictory movement, shifted by the tides rather than
exclusively by its own will.
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In discussing Anzaldu´a’s accounts of activism, Sandoval suggests that her work is
better understood as a ‘topology’ rather than a typology (2000: 54). Rather than
ranging methods of acting across time and thus dividing them from each other,
Sandoval suggests that Anzaldu´a’s attempt to hold seemingly contradictory
modes together can be understood as an innovative spatialisation. However, in so
doing it would appear that Sandoval is drawing upon an understanding of space
and time, already discussed above, in which space represents co-existence and
time the impossibility of co-existence. In the Critique of Pure Reason, for
example, Kant makes the claim that ‘different times are not simultaneous, but
successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous)’ (1998:
A31/B47). Under this view, difference can only be thought together within space,
since two different points are always in the same space, while two different nows
are always at different times. I would argue that Sandoval is drawing upon
this conceptual schema when she claims that Anzaldu´a’s work suggests an
‘alternative topography of consciousness and action that is not historically or
teleologically organised’ (2000: 55). However, I would suggest that to interpret
Anzaldu´a’s work in this way may miss a more radical interpretation.
If we remain within a framework where time represents division, then space can
only represent togetherness in as much as it is atemporal. That is, insofar as
space is static and unchanging. However, as Doreen Massey has argued, an
unchanging all-encompassing space can not ‘be the sphere of the possibility of
real heterogeneity’ (2005: 40). In contrast to Sandoval, what I would like to
suggest is that rather than shifting from a temporal schema to a spatial one,
Anzaldu´a is implicitly positing another framework within which both linear time
and geometrical space are transformed. That is, to reject an understanding of
time as a single linear causal chain organised teleologically does not mean that
one is, therefore, necessarily arguing for a certain absence of time. Instead, what
could be understood as arising in Anzaldu´a’s work is an effort to think difference
within the supposedly singular moment of time, while also conferring movement
and openness upon the single point of space, which then acts to dislocate
sameness and commensurability, rather than provide a stable location for it.
Taken together this dislocating space and disjointed time enable multiple
histories, loyalties and modes of acting to exist simultaneously.
conclusion
Rather than understanding time and space as the apolitical background within
which social life is played out, this article has argued that these most basic
concepts guide the way we understand ourselves to be with others. I argued that
linear temporal discourses encourage the notion that underlying the qualitative
variability of social life is an all-encompassing quantitative element within which
each person’s moment can be made commensurable with everyone else’s. Further,
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I argued that insofar as time is understood to be made up a sequence of ‘nows’,
which successively annul each other, and within which contradictory acts can not
happen at the same time, then the multiplicity and diversity of social life is
obscured. Instead, difference is ranged along the line of time and discursively
contained within separate moments.
Through an analysis of Gloria Anzaldu´a’s work, I have shown how the utilisation of
these kinds of temporal discourses can restrict the way political communities
operate, both in terms of who can be included and what types of activism are
deemed appropriate. Anzaldu´a’s account of her exclusion from political groups
formed around a single aspect of identity suggested a need for envisioning a sense of
time and space that would enable a recognition of multiple, contradictory
allegiances within the ‘same’ moment. Further, her account of social activism, in
terms of the sandbar, modelled an understanding of activism that did not fall into
developmental and teleological frameworks, but which attempted to recognise the
value of multiple ways of acting simultaneously. In so doing, I argued that her work
can be read as an effort to break open the singularity of the moment that would
allow only one way of acting, one way of responding to others, one type of loyalty, or
one response to calls for justice, in order to think of a way of being ‘at the same
time’ that enables a recognition of difference within the ‘same’ moment.
Overall, then, I have sought to show that in challenging concepts of homogeneous
community and categorical identity, Anzaldu´a’s work also challenges dominant
concepts of time and space. In this way I have sought to offer another avenue for
interpreting her work. However, this has not been to suggest that the
interconnection between concepts of time, space and community is a contingent
element of Anzaldu´a’s work alone, but rather to point towards the way time
and space shape how we understand ourselves to be with others more generally.
Consequently, reconsidering what kinds of possibilities are available for connec-
ting and interacting with others in less exclusionary ways rests, partly, on how
one understands the possibilities of sharing time and space with others.
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